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Abstract: This paper reviews recent attempts at modelling inequality of wealth
as an emergent phenomenon of interacting-agent processes. We point out that
recent models of wealth condensation which draw their inspiration frommolec-
ular dynamics have, in fact, reinvented a process introduced quite some time
ago by Angle (1986) in the sociological literature. We emphasize some prob-
lematic aspects of simple wealth exchange models and contrast them with a
monetary model based on economic principles of market mediated exchange.
The paper also reports new results on the influence of market power on the
wealth distribution in statistical equilibrium. As it turns out, inequality in-
creases but market power alone is not sufficient for changing the exponential
tails of simple exchange models into Pareto tails.
1 Introduction
Since the days of Vilfredo Pareto, the frequency distribution of wealth among
the members of a society has been the subject of intense empirical research.
Recent research confirms that power-law behaviour with an exponent between
1 and 2 indeed seems to characterize the right tail of the distribution (Levy
and Solomon, 1997; Castaldi and Milakovic, 2005). However, when applied to
the entire shape of the empirical distribution, the power law would produce a
rather mediocre fit and would be outperformed by other candidate processes
like the lognormal or Gamma distributions. As it seems to emerge from the
literature, a transition occurs in the data from an exponential shape to power-
law behavior somewhere above the 90 percent quantile again.
These and other findings should give rise to modelling efforts explaining the
remarkably similar wealth distribution of many developed countries. Unfor-
tunately, economic theory has been quite silent on this topic for a long time.
Until recently, one had to go back the to literature of the fifties and six-
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ties (e.g., Champernowne, 1953; Mandelbrot, 1961) to find stochastic models
of wealth accumulation in modern societies. Recent advances in computer
technology, however, open another avenue for analysis of the emergence of
wealth distributions allowing this issue to be studied in a computational agent-
based framework. Such a bottom-up approach could, in principle, be helpful
in isolating the key mechanisms that apparently lead to a stratification of
wealth in advanced economies. As it appears, this path has been pursued re-
cently by physicists rather than economists (cf. Bouchaud and Me´zard, 2000;
Draˇgulescu and Yakovenko, 2000; Chakraborty and Chakrabarty, 2000; Sil-
ver, Slad and Takamoto, 2002, among others). However, it has been entirely
overlooked in the pertinent publications that these models have an important
predecessor in the sociological literature. Investigating essentially the same
structures already almost twenty years ago, Angle, 1986, might be consid-
ered as the first contribution to agent-based analysis of wealth formation. In
the following, I will shortly review Angle’s interesting work as the prototypi-
cal agent-based model of wealth dynamics, based on particle-like microscopic
interactions of agents. I will point out aspects of this class of models (cov-
ering most of the econophysics contributions mentioned above) that would
be considered to be problematic by economists (section 2). As an alternative
framework, I will, then, review the contribution by Silver et. al. (2002) which
much better fits into standard economic reasoning, but nevertheless provides
a similarly simple formalization of an agent-based exchange model (section 3).
Section 4 presents some additional results expanding on the seminal frame-
work of Silver et. al. Conclusions are in section 5.
2 Angle’s Surplus Theory of Social Stratification and the
Inequality Process
In a long chain of papers covering more than 15 years, sociologist John Angle
has elaborated on a class of stochastic processes which he first proposed in 1986
as a generating mechanism for the universal emergence of inequality in wealth
distributions in human societies. His starting point is evidence he attributes to
archeological excavations that inequality among the members of a community
is typically first found with the introduction of agriculture and the ensuing
prevalence of food abundance: While simpler hunter/gatherer societies appear
to be rather egalitarian, production of a “surplus” beyond subsistence level
immediately seems to lead to a “ranked society” or some kind of “chiefdom”
(Angle, 1986, p. 298).
So as soon as there is some excess capacity of food, processes seem to be
set into motion from which inequality emerges. Angle, surveying earlier narra-
tive work in sociology, sees this as the result of redistribution by which some
members of society succeed in grabbing some of the surplus wealth of others.
The relevant empirical observations are summarized as follows:
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“Proposition 1: Where people are able to produce a surplus, some
of the surplus would be fugitive and would leave the possession of the
people who produce it.
...
Proposition 2: Wealth confers on those who possess it the ability to
extract wealth from others. So netting out each person’s ability to do
this in a general competition for surplus wealth, the rich tend to take
surplus away from the poor.” (Angle, 1986, p. 298).
According to Angle, the expropriation of the losers happens via (1) theft,
(2) extortion, (3) taxation, (4) exchange coerced by unequal power between
the participants, (5) genuinely voluntary exchange, or (6) gift (ibid.).
The process he designs as a formalisation of these ideas is a true interacting
particle model: in a finite population, agents are randomly matched in pairs
and try to catch part of the other’s wealth. A random toss Dt ∈ {0, 1} decides
which of both agents is the winner of this conflict. Angle in various papers
considers cases with equal winning probabilities 0.5 as well as others with
probabilities being biased in favor of either the wealthier or poorer of both
individuals. If the winner of this encounter is assumed to take away a fixed
proportion of the other’s wealth, ω, the simplest version of the “inequality
process” leads to a stochastic evolution of wealth of individuals i and j who
had bumped into each other according to:
wi,t = wi,t−1 +Dtωwj,t−1 − (1 −Dt)ωwi,t−1,
(1)
wj,t = wj,t−1 + (1 −Dt)ωwi,t−1 −Dtωwj,t−1.
Time t is measured in encounters and one pair of agents from the whole
population is chosen for this interaction in each period. Angle (1986) shows
via simulations that this dynamics leads to a stationary distribution which
can be reasonably well fitted by a Gamma distribution. Angle (1993) provides
an argument for why the Gamma distribution approximates the equilibrium
distribution of the process for empirically relevant values of its parameters.
Later papers provide various extensions of the basic model. While the expo-
nential decay of the Gamma distribution might not be in accordance with
power law behavior at the high end of the richest individuals, Angle’s model
is the first agent-based approach matching several essential features of em-
pirical wealth distributions which he carefully lists as desiderada (i.e. stylized
facts) for a theory of inequality. Among other properties, he emphasizes the
uni-modality with a mode above minimum income which could not be repro-
duced by a monotonic distribution function. Angle is also careful to point out
that with binned data, realizations of his process would be hard to distinguish
from realizations of Pareto random variables which he demonstrates via a few
Monte Carlo runs.
Unfortunately, Angle’s process might be hard to accept for economists as
a theory of the emergence of inequality in market economies.
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First, a glance at the list of the six mechanisms for appropriation of another
agent’s wealth might raise doubts about their relative importance in modern
societies: for most countries of the world, “theft” should perhaps not be the
most eminent mechanism for stratification of the wealth distribution. Note
also that “genuinely voluntary exchange” is listed only at rank 5 and behind
“exchange coerced by unequal power”. However, voluntary exchange is at the
heart of economic activity at all levels of development rather than being a
minor facet.
However, despite being mentioned in the list of mechanisms of redistribu-
tion, voluntary exchange is not really considered in Angle’s model in which
an agent simply takes away part of the belongings of another. What is more,
this kind of encounter would - in its literal sense - hardly be imaginable as
both agents would rather prefer not to participate in this game of a burglar
economy - at least if they possess a minimum degree of risk aversion. The
model, thus, is not in harmony with the principle of voluntary participation
of agents in the hypothesized process which economists would consider to be
an important requirement for a valid theory of exchange activities. One should
also note that another problem is the lack of consideration of the measure-
ment of wealth (in terms of monetary units) and the influence of changes of
the value of certain components of overall wealth.
Despite these problematic features from the viewpoint of economics, An-
gle’s model deserves credit as the first contribution in which inequality results
as an emergent property of an agent-based approach. A glance at the recent
econophysics literature shows that the basic building blocks of practically all
relevant contributions share the structure of the inequality process formalized
by equation (1). The inequality process is, for example, practically identical
to the process proposed by Bouchaud and Me´zard (2000) and isomorphic to
almost all other models mentioned above. This recent strand of research on
wealth dynamics is, therefore, almost exemplary for the lack of coordination
among research pursued on the same topic in different disciplines and for the
unfortunate duplication of effort that comes along with it.
Interestingly, the above criticism concerning the structure of the exchange
process had also been voiced in a review of monetary exchange models devel-
oped by physicists by Hayes (2002) who introduced the label of “theft and
fraud” economies, but restricted it to variants in which the richer could lose
more (in absolute value) than the poor. However, it is not clear why models
which introduce a certain asymmetry to avoid this kind of exploitation should
not also suffer from the lack of willingness of agents to participate in their ex-
change processes. It, therefore, appears that one might wish to reformulate the
“burglar economies” in a way that brings elements of voluntary economic ex-
change processes into play. While the economics literature has not elaborated
on wealth distributions emerging from exchange activities within a group of
agents, a huge variety of approaches is available in economics that could be
utilized for this purpose. An interesting start has been made in a recent paper
by Silver, Slud and Takamoto (2002) which contains a two-good general equi-
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librium model of an economy with heterogenous agents. Somewhat ironically,
the overall outcome of this model is the same as with the inequality process:
the stationary wealth distribution turns out to be a Gamma distribution.
3 An Exchange Economy with Changing Preferences
Unlike the framework reviewed in the previous section, the setting of Silver et
al. is an extremely familiar one for economists. Their economy consists of two
goods, denoted x and y which necessitate the introduction of a relative price p
being defined as the current value of a unit of good y in units of good x. Note
that with this assumption, considerations of revaluation of wealth components
come into play which are altogether neglected in the sociological/physical
models. All agents of the economy have their preferences formalized by a
so-called Cobb-Douglas utility function:
Ui,t = x
fi,t
i,t · y
1−fi,t
i,t . (2)
Here, i and t are indices for the individuals and time, respectively. xi,t
and yi,t are, therefore, the possessions of good x and y by individual i at
time t and fi,t ∈ [0, 1] is a preference parameter which might differ among
individuals and, for one and the same individual, might also change over time.
Ui,t, then, is utility gained by individual i at time t. Individuals start with a
given endowment in t = 0 and try to maximize their utility via transactions in
a competitive market where one good is exchanged against the other. Given
their possessions of both goods at some time t − 1, it is a simple exercise
to compute their demands for goods x and y at time t given the current
preference parameter fi,t:
xi,t = fi,t(xi,t−1 + ptyi,t−1),
(3)
yi,t = (1− fi,t)
(
xi,t−1
pt
+ yi,t−1
)
.
In (3), we have used the standard assumption that agents take the price
as given in a competitive market. Note that this market, therefore, dispenses
with any assumption of unequal exchange or even exploitation which is so
central to the microscopic process of the previous chapter.
Summing up demand and supply by all our agents, we can easily calculate
the equilibrium price which simultaneously clears both markets:
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pt =
∑
i
(1− fi,y)xi,t−1∑
i
fi,tyi,t−1
. (4)
After meeting in the market, each agent possesses a different bundle of
goods and his wealth can be evaluated as:
wi,t = xi,t + ptyi,t. (5)
The driving force of the dynamics of the model by Silver et al. is simply
the assumption of stochastically changing preferences: all fi,t are drawn anew
in each period independently for all individuals. In the baseline scenario, the
fi,t are simply drawn from a uniform distribution over [0, 1], but other distri-
butions lead to essentially the same results. The dynamics is, thus, generated
via the agents’ needs to rebalance their possessions in order to satisfy their
new preference ordering. With all agents attempting to change the composi-
tion of their “wealth”, price changes are triggered because of fluctuations in
the overall demand for x and y. This leads to a revaluation of agents previous
possessions, xi,t−1 and yi,t−1, and works like a capital gain or loss.
To summarize, we have a model in which all agents are identical except
for their random preference shocks and no market or whatsoever power is
attributed to anyone. The resulting inequality (illustrated as the benchmark
case pm = 0 in Fig. 1) is, therefore, the mere consequence of the eventualities
of the history of preference changes and ensuing exchanges of goods. We,
therefore, do not have to impose any type of “power” in order to endogeneously
generate a stratification of the wealth distribution that - like the model of
section 2 - is able to capture all except the very end (the Pareto tail) of the
empirical data.
4 Some Extensions of the Monetary Exchange Model
The model by Silver et al. demonstrates that stratification of wealth can result
from an innocuous exchange dynamics without agents robbing or fleecing each
other. It should, therefore, be a promising avenue to supplement the simpler
dynamic models in the previous section. In some extensions, we, therefore,
tried to explore the sensitivity of this approach to certain changes of its un-
derlying assumptions. Among the many sensitivity tests we could imagine, we
started with the following variations of the basic framework:
• replacement of market interaction by pairwise exchange,
• introduction of agents with higher bargaining power so that the outcome
of pairwise matches could differ from a competitive framework,
• introduction of natural differences among agents of some kind: here we
assumed that for part of the population, preference changes are less pro-
nounced than for others,
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• introduction of savings via a framework which allows for money as an
additional component in the utility function.
Due to space limitations, we will not provide detailed results on all of these
experiments, but will rather confine ourselves to one particularly interesting
variant: the introduction of market power.
Introducing market power of some sort is certainly interesting in light of the
focus of the sociological and physics-inspired literature on issues of power
of some individuals over others. Different avenues for implementing market
power seem possible. Here, for the sake of a first exploration of this issue, we
chose a very simple and extreme one. We assume that part of the population
can act as monopolists in pairwise encounters: if they are matched with an
agent from the complementary subset of non-monopolists, they can demand
the monopoly price. If two non-monopolists are matched, we compute the
competitive solution. We do the same when two monopolists meet each other
assuming that their potential monopolistic power cancels out.
Although this is an almost trivial insight in economics, it should be noted
that the monopolist is not entirely free in dictating any price/transaction
combination, but has to observe the constraint that the other agent has to
voluntarily participate in the transaction. Since the option to not agree on
the transaction would leave the monopolist with a zero gain as well, even in
this extreme market scenario “exploitation” is much more limited than in a
world of “theft and fraud”. Note also that although one could perhaps speak
of exploitation (when comparing the monopoly setting with the competitive
price), no expropriation is involved whatsoever since even the non-monopolist
will still increase his utility by his transaction with the more “powerful” mo-
nopolist.
As it turns out, allowing for monopoly power indeed changes the resulting
wealth distribution. Fig. 1 shows the pdf for (fixed) fractions of monopolists.
Varying the proportion of monopolists from 0 (the former competitive sce-
nario with pair-wise transactions) to 0.4 we see a slight change in the shape of
the distribution. As it happens all distributions still show pronounced expo-
nential decline and can be well fitted by Gamma distributions. However, the
estimated parameters of the Gamma distribution show a systematic variation.
In particular, the slope parameter decreases with the fraction of monopolists,
pm. A closer look at the simulation results also shows that the average wealth
of monopolists exceeds that of other agents but the difference decreases with
increasing pm. Note that the Gini dispersion ratio (G) is a negative function
of λ for the Gamma distribution: G = Γ (λ+0.5)
pi2Γ (λ+1) , so that the increasing in-
equality would also be indicated by this popular statistics.
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Fig. 1: Kernel estimates of statistical wealth distributions with different frac-
tions of monopolistic agents pm. Results are from simulations with 10,000
agents recorded after 5 ∗ 105 trading rounds.
The result that monopoly power is not neutral with respect to the distri-
bution of wealth is certainly reassuring. However, we may also note that its
introduction in the present framework does not lead to a dramatic change of
the shape of the distribution. In particular, it does not seem to lead to any-
thing like a Pareto tail in place of the exponential tail of the more competitive
society. Since we have already chosen the most extreme form of market power
in the above setting it seems also unlikely that one could obtain widely dif-
ferent results with milder forms of bargaining power.
5 Conclusions and Outlook to Future Research
What kind of conclusions can be drawn from this review of different ap-
proaches to agent-based models of wealth stratification? First, it is perhaps
obvious that this author would like to advocate an approach in line with
standard principles of economic modelling. If one is not willing to follow the
emphasis of the sociological literature on all types of exertion of power, and
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if one tends to the view that wealth is influenced more by legal economic ac-
tivity than by illegal theft and fraud, economic exchange should be explicitly
incorporated in such models. This would also help to identify more clearly the
sources of the changes of wealth. Note that despite the voluntary participation
of agents in the exchange economy and the utility-improving nature of each
trade, a change in the distribution of wealth comes with it. The difference to
earlier models is that the changes in wealth are explained by deeper, under-
lying economic forces while they are simply introduced as such in the models
reviewed in sec. 2. Market exchange models also allow to consider changes of
monetary evaluation of goods and assets as a potentially important source of
changes in an individual’s nominal wealth.
Unfortunately, monetary exchange so far does not provide an explanation
of the power-law characterizing the far end of the distribution. As we have
shown above, even an extremely unequal distribution of market power within
the population seems not sufficient to replicate this important empirical fea-
ture. Following recent proposals in the literature one could try additional
positive feedback effects that give agents with an already high level of wealth
an additional advantage (West, 2005; Sinha, 2005).
In the above model, one could argue that the more wealthy agents would
also acquire more bargaining power together with their higher rank in the
wealth hierarchy. Whether this would help to explain the outer region, re-
mains to be analyzed. However, there are perhaps reasons to doubt that the
Pareto feature might be the mere result of clever bargaining. A glance at the
Forbes list of richest individuals (analyzed statistically by Levy and Solomon,
1997, and Castaldi and Milakovic, 2005) reveals that the upper end of the
distribution is not populated by smart dealers who in a myriad of small deals
succeeded to outwit their counterparts. Rather, it is the founders and heirs
of industrial dynasties and successful companies operating in new branches of
economic activity whom we find there1. The conjecture based on this anec-
dotal evidence would be that the upper end of the spectrum has its roots
in risky innovative investments. Few of these succeed but the owners behind
the succeeding ones receive an overwhelming reward. This would suggest that
models without savings and investments should lack a mechanism for a power
law tail. One would, therefore, have to go beyond such conservative models
and combine their exchange mechanism (which works well for the greater part
of the distribution) with an economically plausible process for the emergence
of very big fortunes.
1 While the majority of entrants in the Forbes list might fall into that category, a
few are, in fact, rather suggestive of “theft and fraud” avenues to big fortunes.
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